SENATE:

In the GOP Primary, Crist has maintained over 50% in the ballot test against Rubio, who started with little name ID and has risen to the the mid-20's.

The story here is not particularly surprising: Rubio's numbers began low and had nowhere else to go but up. The race also does not appear to be shifting dramatically or wildly; rather we see the slow and steady increase of Rubio's numbers as more people learn who he is. For example, the Quinnipiac poll released today has the race at 55-26, a very modest gain for Rubio over its 54-23 finding from June.

Buried within the numbers that have come out over the last few months is both good and bad news for Crist. On the upside for Crist, his job approval is good: 60% is a pretty strong number for a Governor in a state that is going through a rough time that is actually shrinking in population for the first time in recent memory. Crist is also not a polarizing figure and general election opponents should be very afraid: Crist's job approval among Democrats is 54%.

Yet there are weaknesses Crist will have to address: namely, the way the ballot test looks when name ID isn't an issue, and the way GOP primary voters stand on items like the stimulus. A poll conducted for Club for Growth in June showed 75% of FL GOP primary voters say the "stimulus was bad" - given Crist's support for the stimulus, this presents a major weakness. Furthermore, a June poll conducted by Mason Dixon showed that among Republicans who know of both Crist and Rubio, the race tightens significantly and Rubio pulls near even. Crist has held onto his share on the ballot test overall but as more Floridians hear Rubio's message, Crist's numbers are vulnerable.

On the Democratic side, the primary is crowded and the candidate who performs the best on the ballot test is Kendrick Meek who still comes in around the teens and 20's.

Because the Democratic field is full of a variety of candidates with regional or district-based appeal but without large statewide name ID, a ballot test is difficult at this point in the game and perhaps not highly illuminating. Nonetheless, the polls show Crist with a large margin over current Democratic frontrunner in the polls Kendrick Meek.

GOVERNOR

While much of the discussion around the Senate race focuses on the primaries, the Governor's race looks like it will likely come down to Attorney General Bill McCollum and state CFO Alex Sink. The aforementioned Quinnipiac poll out today shows McCollum leading the race 38-34 among registered voters, with a 38-23 advantage among independent voters. This is similar to a Mason-Dixon poll from June that showed McCollum with a 41-27 advantage among independents.

While these numbers - and in particular, the advantage among independents - must be seen as reassuring news for Team McCollum, voters don't have an enthusiastically favorable view of either candidate. In that June Mason-Dixon poll, McCollum's name ID was 87% - unsurprising given his long electoral career in the state - but his favorables were only at 29%, with 45% saying they are "neutral". Today's Quinnipiac poll shows better numbers for McCollum, with 42% favorable and 13% unfavorable.

If you feel like you've seen this story before, you're not wrong. The trajectory of the 2009 health care debate seems eerily similar to that of the 2005 battle for Social Security reform. Taking a look at the polling from then and comparing it to the data of today shows the parallels in the situation and shows why the health care debate feels all too familiar.

Similarity #1: Presidential Popularity

First, take a look at a bit of a throwback post from 2006 at MysteryPollster.com where Bush's job approval from January 2005 forward is tracked. Bush began 2005 with job approval over 50% - slightly below where Obama started at the beginning of July (Gallup's 7/05-07/2009 poll had Obama at 56%). The trends are not dissimilar: Charles Franklin's plot of Bush job numbers from January 05 forward shows a similar shrinking of support that looks an awful lot like the Obama job approval chart on the front page. This isn't a particularly surprising finding, but provides context to the other more striking comparisons.

Similarity #2: The Agreement that the Status Quo is Unacceptable

In both the Social Security debate and the health care debate, Americans agree: the system needs major overhaul. While so many other issues fail to get Americans to agree with the crucial "we need to do something" sentiment, both Social Security and health care had that extra boost from a public that agreed: maintaining the current system is not workable long term. In February 2005, Gallup found 73% of Americans said Social Security was "in crisis" or "has major problems". (18% said Social Security was "in crisis").

Compare that to the health care debate of today. Gallup has found that 20% of Americans believe health care is "in crisis" and at least a majority believe it has major problems (unfortunately, Gallup doesn't tell us how large a majority). To flesh that out a bit, Gallup asked the question in November 2008 and found 73% of respondents said that health care was either "in crisis" or had "major problems". Does that number sound familiar?

Similarity #3: Issue Handling

By March 2005, Bush's numbers on issue handling of Social Security were brutal, with an ABC/WaPo poll showing only 35% approving and 56% disapproving. CNN/Gallup had even worse news with only 1 out of 3 approving. Compared to 49% approval shortly after Bush took office, once the issue became a hot topic, Bush's number tanked.

Similarly, Obama's numbers have plummeted on health care since before the debate. In April, during Obama's honeymoon, Pew showed Obama with a 51-26 advantage on health care job approval. By August, he had a 42-43 disadvantage - quite the fall from the earlier numbers. The idea that "the president is more popular than his policies" held true then as it does now. (Just take a look at Mara Liasson's February 2005 NPR story, titled: "Bush More Popular that His Social Security Plan").

In both cases, the President began his administration with the trust and support of the people to fix their given "crisis". In both cases, once the debate flared, their numbers dropped significantly. But it is worthwhile to point out that the comparison is not perfect - the Obama honeymoon numbers were immediately followed by the debate, while Bush had a full four years before tackling Social Security.

At any rate, this is just the basic side-by-side look at the reasons why this health care debate may seem like a bit of a "glitch in the Matrix", giving those who watch politics a sense of deja vu.

Because sometimes the more things change, the more they stay the same.

(This item has been cross posted at The Next Right)

My focus on this site over the last few weeks has been on young voters. And most of the news I have had for the Republican Party has been bad news, presenting a picture of a young cohort less convinced of the virtues of limited government, more supportive of gay marriage, and more inclusive of minority groups less prone to voting Republican.

In all of this, the overall ideological makeup of young voters has not yet been examined. Are young voters more liberal than older voters? Are they more likely to identify as Democrats? Recently on The View, Meghan McCain declared that 81% of young voters identified as Democrats. Though I appreciate Ms. McCain's efforts to draw attention to the GOP's troubles with young voters, the number is greatly exaggerated (and I would argue that exaggerating the problem does the cause no favors).

But the actual numbers are not much more pleasant for the GOP. According to the EMR exit polls at the presidential level, in 2008, 45% of voters 18-29 identified as Democrats while only 27% identified as Republicans. The gap between Democratic and Republican identification has not been so wide since 1976 when only 19% of voters 18-29 identified as Republican. Yet in 1976, young voters did not flee the GOP for the Democratic party. The above figure shows that voters left the Republican Party and became independents that year; Democrats actually saw a 7 point dip among 18-29 year olds in 1976 as well.

The 2008 shift is most concerning for the Republican Party in two ways. First, it shows the highest proportion of young voters identifying as Democrats since 1972. Second, it shows the largest gap between 18-29 year old party ID and overall party ID in that same time frame. Consider 1976, when the post-Watergate voters abandoned the GOP. In that year, Democrats enjoyed a 16 point advantage over Republicans overall. The gap among 18-29 year olds was 21 points - large to be sure, but not so different from voters overall.

Yet in 2008, there was a more marked difference between young voters and the overall electorate. While Democrats held a 7 point advantage over Republicans in terms of party identification overall, that advantage jumps to 18 points among voters 18-29.

However, in terms of ideology, while young voters are quite different from voters overall, the major change did not occur this year or even this decade. In 2008, "Liberal" made a one point gain among young voters, "conservative" a one point loss. The change in young voters didn't look terribly different from the change (or lack thereof) overall, a surprising finding given the major shift in partisan identification.

What is interesting is to take a look at 1992, when liberal overtook conservative among young voters. Conservatism took a five point hit that year, but took an 8 point decrease among young voters. Meanwhile, "liberal" picked up three points overall, but picked up seven points among young voters. Ever since 1992 re-calibrated the ideological makeup of the young electorate, the "liberal" label has outpaced "conservative".

Even odder, take a look back at the first chart of party identification. In 1992, the year the young electorate began identifying "liberal" more often than "conservative", the partisan makeup of young voters was actually more Republican than voters overall. So is ideology simply not as linked to partisan behavior? Or did the ideological shift in the early 1990's simply wait to manifest itself in 2008 as a party identification shift due to a different ideological alignment of the parties themselves? The Republican Party in the 1990's and early 2000s was able to attract young voters despite the fact that young voters were more likely to be liberal than conservative. Even as recently as 2004, Democrats only had a 2 point advantage among young voters.

Between 2004 and 2008, young voters' more liberal ideology started to match up with their partisan identification. A center-left young electorate (emphasis on center) was no longer evenly divided between the parties. As for reasons why, there are countless theories that have been offered to explain the shift. Some say young voters felt out of touch with a GOP that had nominated an older candidate (indeed, look at 1996 when the Republican Party ran the older Bob Dole against Bill Clinton). Some say the Republican Party moved to the right and became an unacceptable option for young center or center-left voters. Some may point to Obama himself as a large driver of young voters affiliating with the Democratic Party.

In order to evaluate the claim that young voters left the Republican Party because of the allure of the Obama candidacy, it is helpful to look at the 2006 election and a handful of midterms preceding it. If the Obama candidacy itself was driving young voters to become Democrats, we would expect to see young voter party identification that was similar to overall party identification, or at least we would expect to see behavior that makes sense in the context of the previous election or two. Yet while in 1998 and 2002 there were roughly equivalent numbers of young Republicans and young Democrats showing up at the polls, in 2006 there was a massive shift toward the Democrats ending in a twelve point Democrat advantage in party identification [in the electorate overall, that advantage wound up being two points, a far smaller gap].

As it turns out, young voters began abandoning the Republican Party long before Barack Obama was even a serious contender for the presidency. Those pinning the Republican Party's poor fortunes among young voters on the Obama candidacy miss the source of the problem and certainly underestimate its severity.

I've been troubled in recent months when discussing the issue of young voters with some fellow Republicans. There seems to be a sort of conventional wisdom that we should expect young voters to trend liberal and Democratic, that the behavior of young voters in 2008 is not serious cause for concern. This stems from a belief in partisanship as a life-cycle factor, that voters start liberal and Democratic and wind up older, conservative, and Republican. But the data paint a very different picture. Take the graph of partisan identification for instance; over the last few decades, young voters have not identified with the Democratic party in substantially higher numbers than voters overall. Even conservatism had its moment among young voters in the 1980's. Yet with the end of the Reagan presidency, young voters shifted toward liberalism. This ideological shift did not play out into actual partisan identification in a meaningful way until 2006 and 2008.

Another bit of conventional wisdom I hear from my fellow Republicans about the youth vote is that they need to vote Democratic twice before they are "locked in for life", supporting the notion that there is still time to turn the tide among this generation. Unfortunately, given that the shift began in 2006 and not 2008, for many voters the GOP may simply be too late. For the rest, if the Republican Party does not take immediate action to repair its brand, this generation may exhibit similarly low levels of Republican identification for years to come.

But beyond these two topics, the Republican Party is facing changing demographic forces that present a challenge to its long term growth. This is not a new notion, and I am obliged to give credit where due: Ruy Teixeira and John Judis' 2002 book The Emerging Democratic Majority looked at political and population trends and predicted that in 2008 these trends would come together produce a Democratic majority.

While I haven't looked extensively at whether or not Teixeira and Judis' predictions have come to pass (2008 Democratic victory aside), I can certainly agree that the racial makeup of young voters supports their conclusion. In short, young voters are less likely to be white than voters overall and are becoming increasingly more diverse. While 77% of voters overall in 2004 were white, only 68% of voters under age 30 were white. By 2008, that number was only 62%. Both African-Americans and Hispanics were found in higher proportions among young voters. In 2004, African-Americans made up 15% of young voters while making up 11% of voters overall; 13% of voters 18-29 were Hispanic compared to 8% of voters overall. By 2008 those numbers had increased, with African-Americans comprising 18% of voters 18-29 and with Hispanics comprising 14%.

So what does this mean for a Republican Party that has been branded (fairly or unfairly) as a party of "old white guys"? Put simply, the party cannot survive with this label attached. The recent demographic changes in the United States have been extraordinary; between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, the number of Hispanics in the United States increased from 22.4 million to 35.3 million, and increase of over 58%. In 1980, 80% of the population identified as white (non-Hispanic); by 2000, that number had fallen to 69% of the population. These changes have expressed themselves in the demographic makeup of the younger voting cohort. With future generations of voters less and less likely to be made up of overwhelming proportions white non-Hispanics, the issue of expanding the Republican Party's appeal to younger voters is inextricably linked with the issue of expanding the party's appeal to minority communities.

In addition to the makeup of the voters themselves, today's young voters have grown up in a society that handles race in a dramatically different way than previous generations. Take for instance college campuses across the United States. In October 1985, there were some 10,846,000 Americans enrolled in college, 9,323,000 of which were white and just over 1,000,000 were African-American. Hispanics made up 579,000 of those enrolled in college as well. By the 2000 Census, those numbers had exploded; just over 17.4 million Americans were enrolled in college and of those, about 11.6 million were white non-Hispanic, while another 1.9 million were Hispanic and 2.2 million were African American. While college enrollment overall was up by 62% in 2000 over 1985, enrollment among Hispanics had more than tripled and more than doubled for African-Americans.

Universities across the United States today boast more diverse student bodies than in decades prior and students in those institutions are far more likely to interact with people of other races and cultures than previous generations. A party that appears to be uninterested in the concerns of (or votes of) African-Americans or Hispanics does not only risk forfeiting a growing segment of the population (and educated population) as a whole. But as white students attend schools and universities with more diverse student populations, the needs and concerns of the African-American and Hispanic communities will not be the abstract concerns of a group of citizens with which they have little contact; quite the contrary, a generation more accustomed to a multicultural America will be likely to find a racially homogenous party to be out of touch. So long as the Republican Party appears inattentive to the needs and desires of minority communities, the Republican Party can be almost certain to retain its minority party status.

President George W. Bush appointed numerous African-Americans to his cabinet during his eight years in the White House - National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as well as Secretary of State Colin Powell to name some of the most prominent appointees. Yet despite the prominent placement of African-Americans in the Bush cabinet, no gains were made among African-American voters. The impact of the election of former Maryland Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele, an African-American, to the leadership of the Republican Party has yet to be seen. Indeed, Steele was largely derided early in his term for such statements as his expressed desire to take conservative principles and "to apply them to urban-surburban hip-hop settings".

African-Americans and Hispanics need to be given reasons to believe that their concerns are being legitimately heard and addressed by the Republican Party. Republicans have had a great deal of success with the Hispanic vote in Florida (particularly the Cuban community) in the past in part as a result of the Republican Party's tough stance on Cuba. In the 2000 campaign,80% of Cubans in the state of Florida voted for George W. Bush, proving a key component of the victory in that state where a margin of 537 votes ostensibly handed Bush the Presidency. By authentically addressing a concern of a portion of the Hispanic community, Republicans helped to develop a credible base of support.

Yet the Republican Party continues to stumble in terms of its handling of the Hispanic and African-American communities. For instance, in late December 2008, candidate for RNC Chair Chip Saltsman, the former campaign manager for the Huckabee presidential campaign, distributed a CD of songs including a track entitled "Barack the Magic Negro", prompting outrage and a rather public and embarrassing moment for the Republican Party. Perhaps even more surprising, some leaders within the Republican Party rushed to Saltsman's aid as POLITICO ran a story with the headline "'Magic Negro' flap might help Saltsman".

Just a troubling is the perception that the GOP ignores minority communities; in 2007, the four major contenders for the Republican presidential nomination declined to attend a forum on issues relevant to the African-American community, and Univision had to cancel a discussion it planned when only McCain agreed to attend.

This incident is to say nothing of the damage to the Republican Party's standing among Hispanics that occurred as a result of the immigration debate that flared in the Summer of 2007; according to a Pew Research Center study, while in July of 2006 Democrats enjoyed only a 21 point party identification advantage among Hispanics, by December of 2007 that had widened out to a 34 point Democratic advantage, alongside a sharp increase in the importance of the immigration issue among Hispanics. In 2004, Bush lost Hispanic voter 44-53, a 9 point margin, yet by 2008, McCain lost Hispanics to Obama by a 36 point margin, garnering 31% of the Hispanic vote compared to the 67% that voted for Obama.

Younger voters are more comfortable with immigration reform than are older voters. In a May 2008 New Models study, age was a significant factor in terms of belief in the statement "Illegal immigration is significantly hurting the country". While a majority of young voters still believe the statement (51%), there is a softening of opinion among young voters compared to the overall (62%) and particularly compared to older voting groups. Furthermore, in a Spring 2008 Harvard Institute of Politics study of 18-24 year olds, when presented with an immigration reform proposal that would give "illegal immigrants now living in the U.S. the right to live here legally if they pay a fine and meet other requirements", 46% of the respondents in the Harvard study supported the proposal while 30% opposed it and 24% neither supported nor opposed. This is not to say younger voters are not concerned about illegal immigration, but rather that they are likely to be more open to reform.

The importance of addressing the needs of minority groups is clear. As a younger and more diverse cohort seeks a party to identify with, the Republican Party must authentically address issues of concern to minority communities. As African-Americans and Hispanics seek opportunities for socioeconomic mobility, efforts such as those to reform education and improve opportunities for small business should be promoted. These policies, such as efforts to improve teacher quality and to reduce needless regulation and taxes on small businesses, would not be a stretch for Republicans to support and speak to the concerns of minority communities.

Moving forward, in order to remain a party that is acceptable for young voters, the Republican Party must shed its image as the party of "old white guys". This includes a change in tone and messaging from those who are the face of the party (in an official or unofficial capacity) as well as an emphasis on policies that have proven, positive outcomes for minority communities. America is quickly becoming an increasingly diverse nation, and the Republican Party must evolve its message and agenda to address these changes in order to have relevance with young voters.

Many in the GOP that I've spoken with are quite confident that, despite differences between the party and young voters on some social issues, young voters are far more libertarian on fiscal issues. The idea that young Americans are largely "fiscally conservative, socially liberal" is one that many Republicans hold on to as a hope that the these voters will reject big government spending, high taxes, "wealth redistribution" and expanded government programs and regulation. On Monday, I posted about the divergence in attitudes toward homosexuality between younger voters and older voters. Indeed, the beliefs held by young voters on gay marriage and homosexuality also differ greatly from the position of the Republican Party, presenting a challenge to the party's ability to grow long-term. However, this was tempered with the reminder that issue salience is key; just because a group of voters disagrees with the GOP on an issue does not preclude those voters from voting Republican or becoming Republican if the issue is not a high priority. While gay marriage may be important to many voters, one issue alone is unlikely to make or break a voter's decision to affiliate with a party unless that issue is clearly dominant in the issue mix.

So what issues are dominant in today's issue mix? The economy. Poll after poll has shown that Americans care about the economy as a top priority and the same is true of young votes. The Harvard Institute of Politics in April 2008 found that the economy was far and away the top issue to 18-24 year olds; 41% of respondents named it as one of the top two national issues that concerned them. And in today's public discourse, the economy has become inextricably linked to taxes and spending. Between TARP, the stimulus package and now the budget, national coverage of government efforts to repair the economy come down to issues of taxing and spending.

Unfortunately, as I noted on Monday, the Republican Party may have bigger problems on its hands in terms of reaching young voters that the differences on the issue of gay marriage. Fundamental principles of the Republican Party - smaller government, lower taxes - are not embraced by younger voters at the same level as voters overall. Fiscal conservatives and Republicans have quite a bit of work ahead for them in terms of winning young voters, as well.

Let's begin with the role of government overall. In a May 2008 national survey conducted by The Winston Group* for nonprofit New Models, respondents were asked if the believed the statement "Government should help people". To be sure, a high positive response rate was to be expected; even many serious libertarians can see a role for government in helping people in some limited cases. Sure enough, 79% of respondents believed the statement. Yet age was a significant factor in looking at responses to this question; 92% of those 18-34 believed the statement compared to 71% of those 65 and older. Younger voters are simply far more likely to believe the government has a role in helping people.

Then there's the issue of the efficacy of tax cuts as economic policy. In the aforementioned Harvard IOP study, when asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement "The best way to increase economic growth and create jobs is to cut taxes.", some 36% agreed with the statement, 23% disagreed, and another 41% said they neither agreed nor disagreed. (Had I put together the questionnaire, I would not have used the same language; I likely would have changed "the best way" to "a good way", as the stronger language here I believe is responsible for the high "neither agree nor disagree" response.)

Looking at a question with a similar aim but different wording, the May 08 New Models study asked if respondents believed that "lowering taxes will benefit the economy". Some 60% of respondents overall believed it, as did 57% of voters 18-34 indicating that young voters do see the efficacy of tax cuts. However, the uncertainty shown in the responses to the Harvard IOP study shows that young voters are uncomfortable with the idea that tax cuts are the only answer or the best answer. While this should give heart to conservatives, it should also serve as a warning that there is work to be done if the right wishes to convince young voters that tax cuts are usually the best option.

Finally, and perhaps most troubling, the conservative notion that the free market tends to hold the answers is not as widely accepted by this new generation. In the May 08 New Models study, respondents were asked if they believed that "the free market is a better way to solve problems than the government". On the whole, the results supported the notion that America tends to be "center-right" - 56% believed the statement while 34% did not (10% did not know or refused to answer). Yet the trend among voters 18-34 was cause for concern - 46% believed the statement while 48% did not believe it. In this case, age was a statistically significant factor. All other age groups found more support for the free market than government.

So what do young voters think about government? Pew's values surveys have shown a shift in how young voters view government efficiency. In their 1987-88 and 2002-2003 studies, respondents were asked "when something is run by the federal government it is usually inefficient and wasteful". In the '87-'88 study, younger respondents were evenly divided with 47% agreeing and 47% disagreeing. Among those 26 and older, some 67% agreed while only 28% disagreed, showing an age gap and a more positive impression of the government among the young. Yet in 2002-2003, impressions of government were more positive overall, particularly among those 18-25. Only 32% of those 18-25 in the 2002-03 study agreed that the government is usually inefficient and wasteful, while 58% of those 26 and older agreed. While these numbers are a few years old, they show an important shift over the last two decades that deserves attention. In short, young voters have a more positive view of the government and its ability to handle responsibilities.

So where should the Republican Party or conservative movement go from here? There is a belief structure among young voters that is slightly in conflict with a core principle of the Republican Party - the belief that the free market trumps government. Young voters have a more positive view of government and are not as convinced that the free market provides better solutions than government.

Yet on the issue of taxes, young voters do believe tax cuts can improve the economy, despite their uncertainty about whether or not tax cuts are the best option. If the Republican Party wants to win young voters in the future, an understanding of the ways that young voters view the economy is essential. Messaging that focuses on the need for less government and lower taxes is not likely to be as well received or convincing to this generation. This isn't to say these messages won't work, to be sure. But the spectre of Big Government is not as frightening to young voters, nor is the devotion to the free market so prevalent. In order for the Republican Party to grow long-term, they must work to impact these belief structures and spend the effort convincing a new generation of the sorts of beliefs that are taken for granted among older cohorts.

*The Winston Group is the author's employer.