"Pollster: No one will meet him. He does not exist because you, as a candidate, pay no attention to polls. You do not do anything until you talk to him first."

Well, not anymore.

The Monday morning column in National Journal from Pollster.com editor Mark Blumenthal collected up the incredible number of references to polls used by those on both sides of the aisle in last week's Health Care Summit at Blair House. The conventional wisdom that politicians are supposed to pretend they don't care about polls has been turned on its head.

I, for one, am glad. In a post a year ago during the forum about Stan Greenberg's Dispatches from the War Room, I applauded his defense of polling as an important part of democratic government nowadays, and suggested that pollsters get to serve as the "reality check" against policymakers who remain hopelessly out of touch with the experience of real Americans.

Polling is an often maligned discipline, seen by some as a crutch for unprincipled politicians to figure out how to be successful political chameleons. And in fairness, I don't doubt that there are some politicians looking to polls to "tell them what to believe." For decades, politicians have often taken the position that they ignore polls and govern from their principles.

Which makes it somewhat refreshing, as a pollster, to see polling serve as an integral part of a major public policy debate.

The challenges of public policy polling are numerous. Do a survey that is too complex on a topic where the public knows little, and the wrong type of question can yield a worthless answer. Almost any positioning of a policy will be objectionable to one or both sides of the political spectrum. (For a great example, see the Pollster.com rundown of a somewhat recent duel over card check polling.) Plus, polls don't happen for free, and the funding for a poll can certainly impact the study's credibility.

But a well-executed survey that tests basic beliefs and attitudes can tell an important story to elected officials and policymakers. It can highlight fears and concerns that might not otherwise be heard absent a wave of letters and phone calls to congressional offices. It can help identify clear, simple ways to engage the public in policy discussions.

A great example comes from a missed opportunity from my own side of the aisle. In 2006 and 2007, Republicans were often seen touting economic growth, proclaiming that the Bush tax cuts had improved the economy. Yet their approval ratings weren't budging. No amount of messaging about a rosy economic outlook was convincing Americans, and folks inside Washington couldn't figure out why. Yet when pollsters and focus group experts took to the field to unravel the mystery, the answer was simple.

From the linked WSJ piece: "The reality, of course, is that the investment tax cuts did help create seven million jobs and did steer the economy out of recession. That doesn't matter to these "stressed out" voters, as Mr. Thau calls them."

The reality was that cost of living increases created real pressure being felt by most Americans, and as a result, the creation of millions of jobs didn't have an impact on the day-to-day American experience for many. Maybe folks weren't calling their Senators en masse, but there was anxiety out there. Research provided a window to the concerns of Americans.

Republicans finally came around with a somewhat successful moment in summer of 2008 focused on lowering gas prices, but by then it was too little too late.

All of which is to say that yes, there is an important place for quality survey research in a public policy debate. The "inside the beltway" distortion field is difficult to escape even for the most earnest policymakers. So long as polling is used appropriately, it can provide helpful clarity and direction to those whose decisions have a major impact on the lives of Americans.

But a year is a long time. With Obama's approval ratings having fallen dramatically since he took office and with Republican victories in VA and NJ statewide elections, both states that Obama had won a year earlier, the question now is: is the GOP back?

I would argue "not yet", and that has quite a bit to do with young voters. Bear in mind that young voters made up woefully slim portions of these off-year electorates (9% in NJ, 10% in VA, compared to 17% and 21% in 2008 respectively).

These groups were also less friendly to the GOP candidates. Exit polls showed Chris Christie won every age group except 18-29 year olds, who broke for Corzine 57-36. (It is a remarkable credit to the McDonnell campaign that they won 18-29 year olds by 10 points, though that margin is slimmer than his overall 16-point victory.)

Young voters have not come back to the GOP and there hasn't been a major effort to win them back. For those who are focused on the short-term fortunes of the Republican Party, young voters seem an irrelevant distraction. It's also easy to dismiss these margins as inevitable. But 18% of the electorate breaking 2 to 1 for your opponent creates a steep uphill climb to victory no matter how you slice it.

Remember, while the conventional wisdom is that young voters are "always" more Democratic, that's definitely not the case; take a look at Patrick Fisher's excellent work on the age gap. He notes that young voters were the strongest supporters of Reagan:

"Dividing the electorate by age into 18-34, 35-64, and 65 and older age groups demonstrates that younger voters tend to vote differently from the rest of the population, but not necessarily more Democratic. In every presidential election from 1960-1976 the 18-34 age group was the most Democratic age group, but in the presidential elections from 1980-1992 the 18-34 age group was the most Republican age group."

Young voters today are still leaning more Democratic and this still presents a problems to the GOP's long term hopes of reassembling a majority coalition. Young voters remain the group that gives Obama his highest approval ratings, and his decrease in approval among voters 18-29 has been only 13 points from January to November, compared to 19 points among voters 30-49.

Even young Republicans nowadays themselves differ from older Republicans. For those young people who do call themselves Republicans or Republican leaners, Washington Post's Jennifer Agiesta finds that there's a greater willingness to want to keep working with Obama, as well as an ideological gap between old and young Republicans. She finds that pluralities of young Republicans think the GOP needs to talk more about the environment (44%), federal spending (57%), illegal immigration (55%), economy and jobs (60%), and - perhaps surprisingly - same-sex marriage (33%).

Yet on a handful of the issues (including the controversial social issues), the Washington Post poll can be described in a number of ways that can seem contradictory. For instance, it is perfectly accurate to say that more young voters than older voters think the GOP focuses too much on abortion. (26% of 18-34 say abortion is focused on "too much", compared to 15% of those 65+) It is also perfectly accurate to say that more young voters think the GOP is not focused enough on abortion (34%) than those who say it is talked about too much (26%). To win young voters, do you talk about it more or talk about it less?

Not to mention the fact that this question doesn't convey how these young Republicans actually stand on these issues; 33% of young Republicans saying the party should focus more on gay marriage doesn't necessarily mean those 33% think the party should fight harder against gay marriage.

I've posted here before about the age gap on the social issues. But what I find more interesting in the data set in Agiesta's piece are the crosstabs about the economic issues. Want to find a way to unify the age groups? Take a look at the economy and jobs, where 60% of Republican voters 18-34, 61% of Republican voters 35-64, and 59% of Republican voters 65 and up all say the Republican Party should focus more on the economy. How about federal spending? With 57% of young Republicans saying the GOP focuses too little on spending (60% overall), it seems to me that the fiscal and economic issues are really where the heart of the potential is for the Republican Party to win these voters back without getting tripped up in the GOP's generation gap.

Beyond the high unemployment rates affecting young Americans, there are other polls have shown why young voters are so focused on spending and the economy. In July, Zogby found that only 18% of voters 18-29 think they are going to see social security checks one day. Young voters understand that growing entitlement spending is creating a long term nightmare for their generation and that high deficits will wind up being on their tab when the bill finally comes due. Winning back young voters starts with the economic issues, and though young voters have not returned to the GOP, the opportunity is ripe for the party to speak to their concerns.

One year later, young voters are still giving Obama a chance and have not returned to the GOP. But the Republican Party now has an opening on issues that do not create an age rift in the party: spending and the economy. It will be up to GOP leadership to take this opportunity and invite young voters to join a Republican majority coalition in greater numbers. Young voters are not lost to the GOP forever, but proactive steps need to be taken to capitalize on the opportunity to drive an economic message.

SENATE:

In the GOP Primary, Crist has maintained over 50% in the ballot test against Rubio, who started with little name ID and has risen to the the mid-20's.

The story here is not particularly surprising: Rubio's numbers began low and had nowhere else to go but up. The race also does not appear to be shifting dramatically or wildly; rather we see the slow and steady increase of Rubio's numbers as more people learn who he is. For example, the Quinnipiac poll released today has the race at 55-26, a very modest gain for Rubio over its 54-23 finding from June.

Buried within the numbers that have come out over the last few months is both good and bad news for Crist. On the upside for Crist, his job approval is good: 60% is a pretty strong number for a Governor in a state that is going through a rough time that is actually shrinking in population for the first time in recent memory. Crist is also not a polarizing figure and general election opponents should be very afraid: Crist's job approval among Democrats is 54%.

Yet there are weaknesses Crist will have to address: namely, the way the ballot test looks when name ID isn't an issue, and the way GOP primary voters stand on items like the stimulus. A poll conducted for Club for Growth in June showed 75% of FL GOP primary voters say the "stimulus was bad" - given Crist's support for the stimulus, this presents a major weakness. Furthermore, a June poll conducted by Mason Dixon showed that among Republicans who know of both Crist and Rubio, the race tightens significantly and Rubio pulls near even. Crist has held onto his share on the ballot test overall but as more Floridians hear Rubio's message, Crist's numbers are vulnerable.

On the Democratic side, the primary is crowded and the candidate who performs the best on the ballot test is Kendrick Meek who still comes in around the teens and 20's.

Because the Democratic field is full of a variety of candidates with regional or district-based appeal but without large statewide name ID, a ballot test is difficult at this point in the game and perhaps not highly illuminating. Nonetheless, the polls show Crist with a large margin over current Democratic frontrunner in the polls Kendrick Meek.

GOVERNOR

While much of the discussion around the Senate race focuses on the primaries, the Governor's race looks like it will likely come down to Attorney General Bill McCollum and state CFO Alex Sink. The aforementioned Quinnipiac poll out today shows McCollum leading the race 38-34 among registered voters, with a 38-23 advantage among independent voters. This is similar to a Mason-Dixon poll from June that showed McCollum with a 41-27 advantage among independents.

While these numbers - and in particular, the advantage among independents - must be seen as reassuring news for Team McCollum, voters don't have an enthusiastically favorable view of either candidate. In that June Mason-Dixon poll, McCollum's name ID was 87% - unsurprising given his long electoral career in the state - but his favorables were only at 29%, with 45% saying they are "neutral". Today's Quinnipiac poll shows better numbers for McCollum, with 42% favorable and 13% unfavorable.

If you feel like you've seen this story before, you're not wrong. The trajectory of the 2009 health care debate seems eerily similar to that of the 2005 battle for Social Security reform. Taking a look at the polling from then and comparing it to the data of today shows the parallels in the situation and shows why the health care debate feels all too familiar.

Similarity #1: Presidential Popularity

First, take a look at a bit of a throwback post from 2006 at MysteryPollster.com where Bush's job approval from January 2005 forward is tracked. Bush began 2005 with job approval over 50% - slightly below where Obama started at the beginning of July (Gallup's 7/05-07/2009 poll had Obama at 56%). The trends are not dissimilar: Charles Franklin's plot of Bush job numbers from January 05 forward shows a similar shrinking of support that looks an awful lot like the Obama job approval chart on the front page. This isn't a particularly surprising finding, but provides context to the other more striking comparisons.

Similarity #2: The Agreement that the Status Quo is Unacceptable

In both the Social Security debate and the health care debate, Americans agree: the system needs major overhaul. While so many other issues fail to get Americans to agree with the crucial "we need to do something" sentiment, both Social Security and health care had that extra boost from a public that agreed: maintaining the current system is not workable long term. In February 2005, Gallup found 73% of Americans said Social Security was "in crisis" or "has major problems". (18% said Social Security was "in crisis").

Compare that to the health care debate of today. Gallup has found that 20% of Americans believe health care is "in crisis" and at least a majority believe it has major problems (unfortunately, Gallup doesn't tell us how large a majority). To flesh that out a bit, Gallup asked the question in November 2008 and found 73% of respondents said that health care was either "in crisis" or had "major problems". Does that number sound familiar?

Similarity #3: Issue Handling

By March 2005, Bush's numbers on issue handling of Social Security were brutal, with an ABC/WaPo poll showing only 35% approving and 56% disapproving. CNN/Gallup had even worse news with only 1 out of 3 approving. Compared to 49% approval shortly after Bush took office, once the issue became a hot topic, Bush's number tanked.

Similarly, Obama's numbers have plummeted on health care since before the debate. In April, during Obama's honeymoon, Pew showed Obama with a 51-26 advantage on health care job approval. By August, he had a 42-43 disadvantage - quite the fall from the earlier numbers. The idea that "the president is more popular than his policies" held true then as it does now. (Just take a look at Mara Liasson's February 2005 NPR story, titled: "Bush More Popular that His Social Security Plan").

In both cases, the President began his administration with the trust and support of the people to fix their given "crisis". In both cases, once the debate flared, their numbers dropped significantly. But it is worthwhile to point out that the comparison is not perfect - the Obama honeymoon numbers were immediately followed by the debate, while Bush had a full four years before tackling Social Security.

At any rate, this is just the basic side-by-side look at the reasons why this health care debate may seem like a bit of a "glitch in the Matrix", giving those who watch politics a sense of deja vu.

Because sometimes the more things change, the more they stay the same.

(This item has been cross posted at The Next Right)

My focus on this site over the last few weeks has been on young voters. And most of the news I have had for the Republican Party has been bad news, presenting a picture of a young cohort less convinced of the virtues of limited government, more supportive of gay marriage, and more inclusive of minority groups less prone to voting Republican.

In all of this, the overall ideological makeup of young voters has not yet been examined. Are young voters more liberal than older voters? Are they more likely to identify as Democrats? Recently on The View, Meghan McCain declared that 81% of young voters identified as Democrats. Though I appreciate Ms. McCain's efforts to draw attention to the GOP's troubles with young voters, the number is greatly exaggerated (and I would argue that exaggerating the problem does the cause no favors).

But the actual numbers are not much more pleasant for the GOP. According to the EMR exit polls at the presidential level, in 2008, 45% of voters 18-29 identified as Democrats while only 27% identified as Republicans. The gap between Democratic and Republican identification has not been so wide since 1976 when only 19% of voters 18-29 identified as Republican. Yet in 1976, young voters did not flee the GOP for the Democratic party. The above figure shows that voters left the Republican Party and became independents that year; Democrats actually saw a 7 point dip among 18-29 year olds in 1976 as well.

The 2008 shift is most concerning for the Republican Party in two ways. First, it shows the highest proportion of young voters identifying as Democrats since 1972. Second, it shows the largest gap between 18-29 year old party ID and overall party ID in that same time frame. Consider 1976, when the post-Watergate voters abandoned the GOP. In that year, Democrats enjoyed a 16 point advantage over Republicans overall. The gap among 18-29 year olds was 21 points - large to be sure, but not so different from voters overall.

Yet in 2008, there was a more marked difference between young voters and the overall electorate. While Democrats held a 7 point advantage over Republicans in terms of party identification overall, that advantage jumps to 18 points among voters 18-29.

However, in terms of ideology, while young voters are quite different from voters overall, the major change did not occur this year or even this decade. In 2008, "Liberal" made a one point gain among young voters, "conservative" a one point loss. The change in young voters didn't look terribly different from the change (or lack thereof) overall, a surprising finding given the major shift in partisan identification.

What is interesting is to take a look at 1992, when liberal overtook conservative among young voters. Conservatism took a five point hit that year, but took an 8 point decrease among young voters. Meanwhile, "liberal" picked up three points overall, but picked up seven points among young voters. Ever since 1992 re-calibrated the ideological makeup of the young electorate, the "liberal" label has outpaced "conservative".

Even odder, take a look back at the first chart of party identification. In 1992, the year the young electorate began identifying "liberal" more often than "conservative", the partisan makeup of young voters was actually more Republican than voters overall. So is ideology simply not as linked to partisan behavior? Or did the ideological shift in the early 1990's simply wait to manifest itself in 2008 as a party identification shift due to a different ideological alignment of the parties themselves? The Republican Party in the 1990's and early 2000s was able to attract young voters despite the fact that young voters were more likely to be liberal than conservative. Even as recently as 2004, Democrats only had a 2 point advantage among young voters.

Between 2004 and 2008, young voters' more liberal ideology started to match up with their partisan identification. A center-left young electorate (emphasis on center) was no longer evenly divided between the parties. As for reasons why, there are countless theories that have been offered to explain the shift. Some say young voters felt out of touch with a GOP that had nominated an older candidate (indeed, look at 1996 when the Republican Party ran the older Bob Dole against Bill Clinton). Some say the Republican Party moved to the right and became an unacceptable option for young center or center-left voters. Some may point to Obama himself as a large driver of young voters affiliating with the Democratic Party.

In order to evaluate the claim that young voters left the Republican Party because of the allure of the Obama candidacy, it is helpful to look at the 2006 election and a handful of midterms preceding it. If the Obama candidacy itself was driving young voters to become Democrats, we would expect to see young voter party identification that was similar to overall party identification, or at least we would expect to see behavior that makes sense in the context of the previous election or two. Yet while in 1998 and 2002 there were roughly equivalent numbers of young Republicans and young Democrats showing up at the polls, in 2006 there was a massive shift toward the Democrats ending in a twelve point Democrat advantage in party identification [in the electorate overall, that advantage wound up being two points, a far smaller gap].

As it turns out, young voters began abandoning the Republican Party long before Barack Obama was even a serious contender for the presidency. Those pinning the Republican Party's poor fortunes among young voters on the Obama candidacy miss the source of the problem and certainly underestimate its severity.

I've been troubled in recent months when discussing the issue of young voters with some fellow Republicans. There seems to be a sort of conventional wisdom that we should expect young voters to trend liberal and Democratic, that the behavior of young voters in 2008 is not serious cause for concern. This stems from a belief in partisanship as a life-cycle factor, that voters start liberal and Democratic and wind up older, conservative, and Republican. But the data paint a very different picture. Take the graph of partisan identification for instance; over the last few decades, young voters have not identified with the Democratic party in substantially higher numbers than voters overall. Even conservatism had its moment among young voters in the 1980's. Yet with the end of the Reagan presidency, young voters shifted toward liberalism. This ideological shift did not play out into actual partisan identification in a meaningful way until 2006 and 2008.

Another bit of conventional wisdom I hear from my fellow Republicans about the youth vote is that they need to vote Democratic twice before they are "locked in for life", supporting the notion that there is still time to turn the tide among this generation. Unfortunately, given that the shift began in 2006 and not 2008, for many voters the GOP may simply be too late. For the rest, if the Republican Party does not take immediate action to repair its brand, this generation may exhibit similarly low levels of Republican identification for years to come.